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Abstract: This chapter brings together debates in political philosophy and 
epistemology over what we should do when we disagree. While it might be 
tempting to think that we can apply one debate to the other, there are significant 
differences that may threaten this project. The specification of who qualifies as a 
civic or epistemic peer are not coextensive, utilizing different idealizations in 
denoting peerhood. In addition, the scope of disagreements that are relevant vary 
according to whether the methodology chosen falls within ideal theory or nonideal 
theory. Finally, the two literatures focus on different units of analysis that diverge 
according to the philosophical purpose behind their investigation of disagreement. 
Epistemologists analyze the rationality of individuals’ belief states whereas political 
philosophers focus on the just governance of a diverse society. Despite these 
differences, political epistemologists can learn valuable lessons by considering 
these debates side by side in order to provide insights that address a host of 
different challenges posed by political disagreement. The core lesson to draw from 
the disanalogies outlined in this paper is that to make progress, careful attention 
should be paid to specifying the goal of any particular project within political 
epistemology. 
 
 
Intro 
 
Disagreement is a persistent problem in our shared political lives. Many political 
disagreements strike at the heart of our most cherished values and impact the shape of 
our society. Political epistemology brings epistemology and political philosophy together 
to shed light on such issues as the deep disagreements that characterize contemporary 
political discourse. Alongside, and predating, epistemic discussions of disagreement is the 
vast literature growing out of Rawls’s Political Liberalism, which seeks to find fair terms of 
cooperation in the face of deep and persistent reasonable disagreement about the good.1  
 
Political philosophers focus on intractable disagreements about our deeper worldviews, 
religious beliefs, morality, and the good life. Rawls explains that the wide diversity of 
views in society is a predictable and welcome outcome of institutions that protect citizens’ 
freedom. He asks, “how is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society 
of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines?” (Rawls 2005, 4). Rawls’ question has been at the 
center of a wide set of debates about moral and political disagreement. Furthermore, 
contemporary investigations of the epistemology of democracy, many of which focus on 
 
1 Rawls’s turn towards political liberalism began in his 1980 Dewey lectures at Columbia University, 
culminating in the publication of Political Liberalism in 1993. He continued to revise and expand political 
liberalism in response to critiques of the work. I have included the citation to the expanded edition (2005).  
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disagreement, grow out of Rawlsian influences (e.g., Cohen 1986, Bohman and Rehg 
1997, Gutmann and Thompson 1998).  
 
More recently, social epistemologists have begun to ask questions about the epistemic 
significance of disagreement (e.g., Feldman and Warfield 2010, Christensen and Lackey 
2013). Debates center on questions about responsible epistemic agency when 
encountering an epistemic peer who disagrees and whether a given body of evidence 
justifies one or more rational epistemic states.2  
 
This chapter brings together debates in political philosophy and epistemology over what 
we should do when we disagree. While it might be tempting to think we can readily apply 
one debate to the other, significant differences between the two threaten this project. 
After outlining different factors that might cause disagreement among citizens, I will 
examine how peerhood is specified in each literature and which idealizations are relevant 
when defining who qualifies as a peer. Next, I show how the two literatures focus on 
different units of analysis that diverge according to the philosophical purpose behind their 
respective investigations of disagreement. Epistemologists analyze the rationality of 
individuals’ belief states whereas political philosophers focus on the just governance of a 
diverse society. Despite these many differences, political epistemologists can learn 
valuable lessons by considering these debates side by side in order to provide insights that 
address a host of different challenges posed by political disagreement.  The core lesson to 
draw from the disanalogies outlined in this paper is that to make progress, careful 
attention should be paid to specifying the goal of any particular project within political 
epistemology.  
 
What causes disagreement?  
 
When considering why people disagree about politics, a variety of factors may explain this 
disagreement. According to Rawls, disagreement is inevitable among well-motivated 
citizens who respect one another as free and equal, and who seek terms of cooperation 
that protect basic democratic rights and are fair to all.3  Rawls refers to the many “sources 
of disagreement” between reasonable individuals as the burdens of judgment (Rawls 
2005: 55). The burdens of judgment explain how well motivated individuals who are 
reasoning responsibly could nevertheless come to incompatible (but equally reasonable) 
positions (Rawls 2005: 54-58).4 While the burdens of judgment is a convenient way to 
reference the many influences on people’s political views, one need not be a Rawlsian to 
recognize similarly complex influences on individuals that explain why disagreement 
 
2 The latter issue concerns the “uniqueness thesis” and is the subject to of a separate chapter in this 
handbook. As such, I largely set it aside herein.  
3 Rawls refers to such disagreements as ‘reasonable’ disagreements, using the term uses the term 
‘reasonable’ as a technical term, with specific qualifications, to specify the range of disagreements he 
considers in Political Liberalism. Rawls contrasts reasonable pluralism with simple pluralism, which may also 
include unreasonable, irrational, “and even mad” comprehensive doctrines (Rawls 2005, xvi). In this paper, 
I bracket discussions of how we should understand Rawlsian reasonableness to keep the focus on more 
general lessons for the disagreement literature in political epistemology.  
4 Rawlsians will recognize many of the factors I survey in this section as examples of the types of 
disagreements that Rawls includes in the burdens of judgment.  
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arises between morally upright and responsible citizens (e.g., Mason 1993, Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996).  
 
For those who seek to analyze political disagreement typical in ordinary societies, the 
causes of disagreement expand greatly (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 18-26). In 
addition to morally upright and rational individuals disagreeing while doing their best to 
reason responsibly, society is filled with a more complex range of incompatible values.  
Many actual citizens do not embrace the liberal values that underlie Rawls’s ideal 
conception of reasonable citizens. Not everyone view politics as a means for seeking just 
and fair terms of cooperation; instead, some people aim to ensure their own moral views 
become the law of the land. Some also view politics as tool for gaining power and 
influence in society. In addition, citizens’ knowledge about politically relevant issues 
varies significantly. 
 
Herein, I will consider four salient reasons why two people may find themselves 
disagreeing about politics.  
 
1.Evidence. Sometimes disagreement arises because the parties to the disagreement 
draw on different sources of evidence for their beliefs. For example, if there are 
conflicting reports about a particular event in different newspapers, and we form 
our beliefs on the basis of our trusted news source—unaware that it is contested—
we might hold different views about the event in question. Our disagreement, 
however, can be traced to the different sources of evidence that ground our 
beliefs. Revealing these sources could illuminate why we disagree, however 
resolving the disagreement may require further questions to establish which (if 
either) source is accurate.  
 
2. Interpretation. Disagreement may also arise because we interpret shared evidence 
differently. When faced with new information, people naturally try to assimilate it 
into their worldviews. Preexisting commitments and past life experiences can 
significantly impact how any particular proposition is interpreted by an individual. 
Furthermore, a host of well-documented cognitive biases can impact belief 
formation, from confirmation bias to the availability heuristic to framing effects—
i.e. the ways and order in which information is presented can have an outsized 
impact on how the same piece of evidence is interpreted (see Kahneman 2011).  
 
3. Values. People frequently disagree about which values are relevant to particular 
cases that arise in political life. But even if they agree about the relevant values, 
they often disagree about how to properly weigh and prioritize relevant values. 
Many moral and political concepts are also open to a range of reasonable 
interpretations.5 In politics, we are frequently faced with genuinely difficult cases 
that require individuals to exercise judgment. And for these variety of factors, our 
judgment about what is best may vary greatly.  
 
 
5 For example, what kind of equality are we trying to establish and why? How should freedom be 
interpreted: is this negative freedom, positive freedom, freedom from domination?  
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4. Experiences and Circumstances. Our moral, religious, and political stances are often 
influenced by our life circumstances, including our upbringing, education, family, 
community, work, and geographic location, among many other factors. Our 
experiences and circumstances also impact what we know, what new experiences 
and information we encounter, and how we assess new information in light of all 
of this. 
 
In short, “citizens’ total experiences are disparate enough for their judgments to diverge, 
at least to some degree, on many if not most cases of significant complexity” (Rawls 2005: 
57). Given the various reasons why disagreement might arise between people, the way in 
which we specify the types of disagreements that are of philosophical interest is important. 
Are we analyzing any form of political disagreement that can arise between citizens, or 
only disagreement amongst some subset of citizens who qualify as peers? If so, how should 
we specify this basic qualification?  
 
What makes two people ‘peers’?  
 
When investigating the epistemological significance of disagreement, epistemologists often 
focus on the degree of belief revision, if any, required to maintain the rationality of belief 
in the face of disagreement. Of course, not just any disagreement is epistemically 
significant. When there is a clear asymmetry of information, expertise, and/or capacities, 
disagreement need not threaten the epistemic bona fides of the well-justified believer. To 
know whether to revise beliefs when faced with disagreement, we should consider the 
capacities, source of information, and expertise of the person with whom we disagree. Do 
they have roughly equal intellectual capacities to our own? Are they victim to any 
distorting epistemic factors, e.g., fatigue or inebriation that could temporarily impair their 
cognitive function? Are they misinformed or did they overlook a significant piece of 
evidence? Do they have the same level of expertise in the disputed area?   
 
If both parties to the disagreement share the same evidence on the disputed proposition, 
have roughly equal intellectual capacities for assessing this evidence, and there are no 
other distorting factors—they are epistemic peers.6 Epistemic peers are symmetrically 
situated with regard to the disputed proposition. So defined, it should be clear that 
disagreement between epistemic peers cannot be sorted out by identifying a mistake in 
reasoning, a piece of evidence that was overlooked.  
 
By contrast to epistemologists, political philosophers tackle a different type of question 
about disagreement. Their concern is not what is rational to believe when encountering 
peer disagreement. Rather, they seek principles of justice that can govern a political 
community characterized by deep disagreements between members. For this project, the 
question of epistemic parity between parties is not a primary concern. Instead, civic peers 
are members of the same political community.7  Civic peers are members of a shared 
 
6 This specification of who qualifies as an epistemic peer is widely shared by epistemologists on different 
sides of the debate about the rational response to peer disagreement. See, e.g., Kelly 2005, Christensen 
2007, Elga 2007, Lackey 2010, and Goldman 2010.  
7 Many political philosophers use the term ‘citizens’ to describe this relationship. Citizen refers to people in 
their capacities as political agents in a particular community and, when used in political philosophy, is not 
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political community, and have certain rights and duties accordingly. Civic peers are 
governed by the same laws, part of a shared distributive scheme, and often share political 
power.  
 
What role do idealizing assumptions play in discussions of disagreement?  
 
As we’ve seen, the debates about disagreement in epistemology are framed differently 
from those in political philosophy. At first glance, it might be tempting to see the 
differences as differences between an idealized conception of disagreement between 
epistemic peers and the more practically grounded disagreement that characterizes 
politics. But that would be too quick. The divide is not simply between ideal theory and 
nonideal theory; rather, the difference lies in what is idealized. There are different 
idealizations at play in both literatures and more clarity around which ideals are used and 
why will help us avoid pitfalls that can arise by simply bringing the two debates together.   
 
In epistemology, idealizations help focus the inquiry on the rational response to the purest 
case of disagreement between peers. The central idealizations stipulate symmetry between 
the parties. That is, epistemologists stipulate that both parties are: 1) intellectual peers—
they have similar (or, more idealized, the same) capacities for assessing the evidence and 
arguments relevant to the question at hand, 2) have access to the same evidence bearing 
on the proposition about which there is disagreement, and 3) neither party has any 
antecedent reason to assume that they rather than their peer is more likely to be right or 
wrong in this domain. They have a similar track record such that they regard each other 
as epistemic peers for the case at hand.8 While responses to peer disagreement differ in 
the literature, most sides to the debate share a similarly idealized conception of what 
qualifies two individuals as epistemic peers.   
 
By contrast, the question of which idealizations are helpful to stipulate when tackling 
disagreement between civic peers is subject to extensive debate in political philosophy 
(see, e.g., Mills 2005, Simmons 2010, Anderson 2010, Estlund 2020). This question is 
frequently methodological. Should we first clarify an ideal of justice, to offer a telos that 
can guide our work to improve existing unjust social arrangements? Or should we turn 
first to the unjust and messy world to diagnose existing injustices and seek to rectify them 
as we progress? Ideal theorists argue that insofar as any effort to identify injustice 
implicitly relies on some as of yet unrealized ideal of justice, it will be practically best to 
make that ideal explicit from the get-go. Nonideal theorists critique ideal theorists for 
failing to address injustices in society or, worse, structuring their theory in a way that it is 
unable to recognize clear injustices. They argue that many injustices are well established 
and easily identifiable, so a project that seeks justice should start with the messy world and 
find ways of improving it.  
 
 
intended to track immigration status. Since immigrants are often times important civic peers and members 
of the political community, I opt for this more inclusive term.  
8 I’ve stated this somewhat loosely as it might make a difference whether we are stipulating that two people 
are in fact epistemic peers, or whether each are believed to be a peer, or whether each party is justified in 
believing that they are peers (see Enoch 2010: 970-974). 
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How do ideal and nonideal theorists each think about civic peers? Nonideal theorists are 
more likely to look at people as they are, with complex motivations, implicit and explicit 
biases, and various degrees of willingness to comply with just social orders. By contrast, 
ideal theorists often build in idealizing assumptions about citizens and society, which vary 
according to the aims of their political project. For example, to establish the possibility of 
a just social order that remains stable despite deep and persistent disagreement between 
citizens (Rawls 2005), it is helpful to stipulate that all parties to the disagreement are 
committed to cooperating on fair terms. The challenge is then focused on how to specify 
principles of justice and legitimacy when people disagree. The idealizations relevant to 
this project have little to do with epistemic symmetry between parties. Instead, the central 
idealizations stipulate a shared commitment to the aim of the project, seeking a just social 
order that respects individuals.   
 
Determining which (if any) idealizations are used to specify the qualification of civic 
peerhood makes a significant difference to the ultimate theory. An idealized conception of 
disagreement between civic peers who are motivated to cooperate on just and fair terms is 
a very different problem, and may require a different response, than disagreements 
between civic peers who are not so well-motivated. Should the qualification for civic peers 
be defined in terms of a basic moral threshold or are epistemic qualifications also 
important? Should the moral threshold be set low to rule out only psychopaths and 
tyrants? How should common forms of injustice and discrimination fit into idealizing 
assumptions about disagreement? Theorists vary widely on all of these questions. 
Nevertheless, the debate about how to cooperate on fair terms with those who disagree is 
unified in treating the question as a moral problem to be adjudicated between members 
of a political community.  
 
The different idealizations used to specify peerhood in the epistemology and political 
philosophy of disagreement are ultimately tied to core differences concerning the 
philosophical purpose of investigating disagreement. Should we assume peers are 
epistemic equals (in terms of capacities, access to the evidence, justification, etc.) in order 
to clarify what a rational individual should believe? Or should we assume peers are moral 
equals (showing equal moral respect for one another and agreeing to cooperating on fair 
terms that secure individuals’ basic rights) to clarify how to structure a just society? Or, 
should we reject ideal theory and tackle questions of disagreement between any members 
of a shared political community? Political epistemologists who seek to bridge the 
epistemology and political philosophy of disagreement should keep track of the different 
idealizing assumptions in each literature and should carefully specify how they define 
peerhood for specific projects within political epistemology.  
 
What is the basic unit of analysis?  
 
So far, we have looked at different factors that may cause two people to disagree and the 
specific requirements and idealizations used to establish whether that disagreement is 
between peers. This might suggest that the core differences are in how peer disagreement 
is specified. But there are deeper differences in the basic unit of analysis for each theory: 
epistemologists focus on individuals’ belief states whereas political philosophers focus on 
the just governance of society.  
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While the epistemology of disagreement is a thriving area of social epistemology, the 
focus remains squarely on the appropriate epistemic stance individuals should take 
towards their own beliefs when faced with peer disagreement. The social elements come 
in because the individual is considering the epistemic impact of their peer’s contrary 
belief. Yet it matters little who the peer is, provided symmetry between the parties has 
been established. In fact, the interpersonal element can drop away altogether; the same 
intuitions apply to differences between just one individual’s views over time.9 The 
conclusions drawn about the epistemic impact of peer disagreement, thus fit within a 
much larger literature about responsible belief, epistemic agency, and the acquisition of 
knowledge and understanding. In all of these cases, the core unit of analysis is the 
individual and her epistemic states, and the conclusions drawn primarily concern 
responsible individual epistemic agency.  
 
By contrast, when political philosophers consider disagreement between citizens, the 
focus is not on what each person believes. Rather, it is on how to structure legitimate 
governance of a diverse society. The primary unit of analysis is the terms of justice, 
structure of legitimate government, and/or specific political policies and laws. They ask: 
which principles of justice can govern a society in which moral, religious, philosophical, 
and political views are deeply contested? How can we ensure coercive power is legitimate 
when citizens hold a wide variety of opposing beliefs? What can be justified to a diverse 
political community, and seek to evaluate policies against a wide variety of viewpoints.  
 
This does not imply that individuals’ viewpoints are irrelevant. To figure out what might 
be acceptable to a community, we must figure out what is acceptable to the individual 
members of the community. But the core focus is not individuals’ justified epistemic 
states. Rather the focus is on which proposals survive contestation from the many 
members of a political community and how political processes (e.g., deliberation, debate, 
voting, etc.) are structured to allow disagreeing parties to debate, vote, and find fair terms 
of cooperation in spite of persistent disagreement between citizens. Some epistemic 
democrats add that certain deliberative or aggregative procedures have epistemic value 
either for individuals (who learn from deliberation with others) or for society (improving 
the epistemic quality of democratic decisions). Nevertheless, the problem of disagreement 
is generally framed as a collective problem for social governance.  
 
Should disagreements be resolved or managed? 
 
The last major difference between the epistemology and political philosophy I will survey 
in this paper lies in how each theory approaches solutions to the problem posed by 
disagreement. Should disagreements be resolved or managed?  
 
Epistemologists seek to determine how a responsible epistemic agent should respond to 
the prima facie challenge peer disagreement poses to the rationality of her beliefs. They 
seek a rational resolution to disagreement to ensure that individuals maintain justified 
 
9 Thomas Kelly, for example, asks us to consider parallels between an individual’s own justified belief at 
different points in time and the classic cases of peer disagreement (Kelly 2013, 32-33). 
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epistemic states.  Should an individual revise her confidence in her belief, suspend 
judgment on the issue at stake, or is it rationally permissible to set aside the significance of 
the disagreement and stick to her guns? No matter which response is deemed appropriate, 
the assumption in the literature is that there is a rational resolution to the challenge of 
peer disagreement. The response hinges on whether and to what degree peer 
disagreement is epistemically significant for an individual. 
 
By contrast, political philosophers do not seek rational resolution to the disagreement. 
Instead, they view disagreement as a persistent problem in political life and thus seek fair 
terms according to which we can manage our disagreements. Unlike the cases discussed 
in the epistemology of disagreement, political disagreement is not a problem that can be 
overcome. While some disagreements may be resolved over time and many political 
debates are aimed at trying to convince others of one’s view, disagreement is a permanent 
feature of democratic politics. In any society that protects basic democratic rights to 
freedom of conscience and expression, a diversity of incompatible but nevertheless 
reasonable views will remain (Rawls 2005: 37). Given the “intractable sources of 
disagreement,” theorists should not only offer ways of adjudicating political 
disagreements, their theory should also enable citizens to learn to live with persistent 
disagreements (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 360). Thus, the project is not about 
resolution but of management. We must enable citizens to live with disagreements that 
persist, and do so in a way that still fosters just social institutions and fair modes of 
government. For many political philosophers, this means finding ways to structure 
productive political discussions in spite of disagreement and find procedures that can 
secure legitimate rule for a diverse society in which citizens continue to disagree with one 
another. Furthermore, on most democratic or political liberal theories, it is permissible for 
individuals to object to the outcome of any political decision and believe that it is 
incorrect, irresponsible, immoral, or unjust. Agreement on specific policies is unlikely and 
not expected for a proposal to be legitimate. The core question is what makes proposals 
legitimate despite individuals’ objections. 
 
Lessons for Political Epistemologists 
 
As we’ve seen, many of the differences between epistemic and political approaches to 
disagreement grow out of the differences between each inquiry’s aim: whether the goal is 
evaluating individuals’ epistemic states or finding just political principles to govern 
society. The different aims explain many subsidiary differences concerning: the 
specification of peerhood, which factors contribute to peer disagreement, the idealizations 
used in theorizing, whether the analysis focuses on individuals or society, and whether 
disagreement should be seen as a problem to resolve or manage. These differences may 
pose some difficulties for political epistemologists who seek to bring together these two 
literatures in order to evaluate political disagreement.10 Nevertheless, there are lessons to 
 
10 I do not mean to overstate the challenges in bringing these two literatures together. Some political 
philosophers have drawn on the epistemology of disagreement in order to defend their political theories 
(see, e.g. Peter 2013). While others have used the epistemology of disagreement to critique public reason 
theorists (see, e.g., Enoch 2017 and van Wietmarschen 2018). 
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be drawn from considering these differences in order to carve out fruitful paths forward 
for political epistemology. 
 
Lessons drawn from the peer disagreement literature may not directly apply to political 
disagreements between citizens who may or may not be epistemic peers. The variety of 
factors that contribute to political disagreements extend beyond the more narrow 
conception of epistemic peers. Epistemic parity between citizens is often difficult to 
determine, even more so with the splintering of information spheres and the hyper-
personalization of digital access to politically relevant information. In cases of uncertainty 
about the epistemic status of our interlocutor, it is still important to consider how to 
resolve disagreement in an epistemically responsible manner.  
 
In addition, people’s political beliefs are often adopted in a cluster of positions, such that 
co-partisans have many beliefs in common whereas members of different political parties 
may have very few overlapping commitments. This leads many people to have greater 
default trust in people who share their political views.11 To establish two parties’ status as 
epistemic peers, epistemologists look for a similar track record of performance in the 
domain in question. While we can establish an agreed upon track record of success in 
one’s past performance in many fields, this is far easier when faced with issues where 
there is more settled consensus on shared standards for assessment. This is less available 
in political disagreements. The standards for assessing one’s track record about political 
disputes are often just as controversial as a disagreement about any particular issue. It 
may be difficult for citizens from different political parties to see one another as epistemic 
peers in the relevant domain because our disagreements about political issues come in 
clusters such that we may not find a core area of agreement by which to judge each other 
epistemic peers.12  
 
In this fractured context, trying to approach political debate as if we’re talking about 
epistemic peers will be no less divisive than politics as usual. We may be apt to downgrade 
the epistemic standing of individuals who do not share our commitments, judging them to 
be insufficiently responsive to the evidence we take to justify our own beliefs. Once the 
parties to the disagreement have exchanged reasons, they might conclude—on the basis 
of the continued disagreement in light of this exchange—that they were not talking to 
their epistemic peer. If I explain reasons I think decisively support my position and you 
hear those reasons, yet draw a different conclusion or fail to see the weight of the 
evidence, it seems I have new evidence you are not my epistemic peer after all. So much 
the better for my view. 
 
The challenges that arise when attempting to resolve political disagreements are not 
incidental. Political disagreements often hinge on deeper disagreements about moral or 
religious values, the order of priority assigned to shared values, and disagreements about 
 
11 If Regina Rini is right greater trust in co-partisans may even be rational (Rini 2017).  
12 For example, Adam Elga offers a helpful case of two friends who disagree about abortion and a related 
cluster of positions. They are unlikely to judge the other party to be their epistemic peer on any of the 
related cases because the full cluster of moral and political options (Elga 2007).  This problem may also 
extend to our ability to see one another as moral peers. For a great illustration of how clusters of values can 
impact how citizens view one another, see Amanda Greene’s chapter in this volume. 
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the proper role of government in promoting valuable aims. In addition, many people’s 
views about politics relate to diverse aspects of their identity, social location, and 
experience. In these cases, it is difficult to clearly establish all of the information and 
evidence that bear on the belief in question and thus assessing parity of evidence and 
information bearing on the views will be difficult to parse. Resolution to the disagreement 
is often unlikely, even if both parties share their own reasoning behind their political 
views and approach the conversation with intellectual humility, seeking to learn from one 
another. Instead, we should figure our productive ways to live with the disagreements that 
are a persistent feature of politics.  
 
Yet even if we approach political debate as a problem to be managed over time, 
analyzing the epistemic positions embedded in political theories is important for making 
progress. Uncovering the epistemological and metaphysical assumptions that undergird 
different political theories and defending these commitments is fruitful ground for 
philosophical inquiry. For example, what forms of political justification are epistemically 
as well as morally robust? How should an epistemically responsible agent reconcile the 
persistence of political disagreement with their own desire to hold well-justified beliefs 
about these contested questions?  
 
The core lesson to draw from the disanalogies outlined in this paper is that to make 
progress, careful attention should be paid to specifying the goal of any particular project 
within political epistemology. Before beginning a project that simply meshes together the 
two literatures, political epistemologists should first establish what insights they hope to 
attain in a particular project. The aim of the inquiry shapes many features of the 
precedent literature in the epistemology and political philosophy of disagreement. So too, 
the aim of specific projects within political epistemology should inform the choices about 
who qualifies as a peer, which disagreements are relevant, which (if any) idealizations are 
useful, and what level of analysis is appropriate to that aim.  
 
Overall, future directions may turn on how idealized the political epistemology of 
disagreement ought to be. Moving forward, political epistemologists may divide 
themselves into ideal and nonideal theory camps. Yet no matter where one falls on the 
question of idealization, clarity about the aim of the inquiry is important for framing the 
core concept of peerhood at stake. 
 
For those who seek to tackle disagreements between citizens as we find them, it might be 
time to take a nonideal turn within the epistemology of disagreement. All of the diverse 
causes of disagreement between citizens would need to be taken into account if we aim to 
determine the epistemically appropriate response to political disagreement.  Citizens 
whose views all have legitimate political standing in the debate may vary widely in terms 
of their epistemic credentials, evidence they draw on, and the grounding beliefs that 
undergird their political positions. Political epistemologists who seek insights that will help 
us navigate the types of disagreements that people face in contemporary society will need 
to clarify how peerhood should be defined for this project.  
 
For those who seek to use idealizations to clarify the philosophical stakes of disagreement, 
careful attention should be paid to which questions about disagreement the theory aims 
Forthcoming in Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Edited by Michael Hannon and Jeroen de Ridder 
 
 11 
to solve. Different idealizations may be relevant to understanding what citizens ought to 
believe and what theories of justice could govern a society characterized by deep 
disagreements. Likewise, when analyzing the epistemic underpinnings of political theories 
or political implications of epistemic theories, clarity about which idealizations are 
relevant to the joint project may shed light on how existing models might need to change 
to accommodate insights from political epistemology. Idealizations are likely to remain 
helpful for clarifying the issues at stake, but only if these are clearly articulated and 
defended in relation to the ultimate goal of the project. 
 
More broadly, expert disagreement and more general disagreement amongst citizens may 
require different approaches no matter which methodological approach one chooses. 
Expert disagreement mirrors the peer disagreement debate in epistemology, but there 
may be new lessons to draw from shifting the debate from what experts should believe to 
the impact of expert disagreement on public policy. Likewise, there are questions about 
disagreement between citizens that impact what each person is justified in believing as 
well as questions about how to structure the social order to find ways to cooperate in spite 
of persistent disagreements. Both sets of questions are relevant for political epistemology.  
 
Ultimately, I do not seek to come down on either the side of ideal theory or nonideal 
theory in political epistemology. Rather, I hope to encourage open debate about the role 
of ideal theory in political epistemology. No matter which method is chosen, it is essential 
to carefully consider the aims, purpose, and limits of specific projects within political 
epistemology, and the precedent literature in both the epistemology and political 
philosophy of disagreement.13  
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